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ABSTRACT  
 
In Mexico, social capital is used to get resources. People who do not have access to 
formal markets use their networks to acquire public and financing services, social 
insurance and social benefits. To test this, social capital indicators were built using 
the resources supplied by people as a proportion of their income. This measure is 
theoretically related to a sympathy coefficient that represents the degree to which a 
person joins another´s welfare in its utility function, leading him to share resources 
with others. Synthetic panels with population cohorts were elaborated to follow 
population throughout the time. To correct a spurious regression problem, the 
cointegration-panel method was used. As a result, variables that reflect failures in 
financial, health and social insurance markets are associated to bonding and 
bridging social capital indicators. Thus, adjustments in these markets could be 
explained by social capital variables additionally to market prices mechanisms.  
Keywords: social capital, market failures, equilibrium, relationships, 
networks.  
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I. Introduction 
Woolcock, M. (1999), van Bastelaer, Th. (2000), Grootaert, C., and van 
Bastelaer Th. (2002) assert that, in developing countries, many people’s 
access to financial and social services is restricted by failures in formal 
markets. However, this is just restricted to Mexican case, where people 
present the same behaviour (Londoño and Székely, 1997; Birdsall and 
Londoño, 1997b). 
Markets provide goods and services for people which are prepared to pay a 
price that covers their production costs, however, this is not always the case 
since markets may fail to offer certain goods and services. Government 
intervention through subsidies occurs when market conditions to achieve 
efficiency sacrifice equity conditions. Even government could produce 
failures trough poverty trap (Barr, 1998). Market failures are related to 
imperfect markets by problems of asymmetric information, contract breach, 
high transportation and transaction costs, monopoly, public goods and 
inequality problems.  
In the case of financial services, market failures are related with asymmetric 
information problems, contract breach, high transportation and transaction 
costs and inequality problems. This limits access to the poor into the banking 
system because of the costs and risks involved in the allocation of formal 
credit to the population that has no collateral or guarantee (Mansell, 1995, 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Access to formal financial services3
                                                          
3  The formal sector includes commercial banks and savings and loan associations (Woodruff, 
2006). The informal sector is based on the degree of regulation of lending activities and 
includes governmental organizations, corporations and cooperatives, private entrepreneurs, 
traders and lenders. Producers of private and communal lands which provide loans also are 
included in the informal sector. Organizations, companies, cooperatives and associations 
whose financial activities are regulated and partly financed by the state, are placed in the 
category of formal lenders (Swaminathan, M., 1992). 
 is difficult or inaccessible to poor people, 
they have no guarantees such as physical or financial collateral and the 
guarantee is the prerequisite for most loans in the formal sector (van 
Bastelaer, Th., 2000). Banks have no interest in small crops, animals, or 
electrical appliances. In some cases, the poor have an acceptable guarantee: 
the land, however, the lack of legal title prevents offering it as collateral, so 
does the mortgage (Mansell, 1995). Consequently, banks would be based on 
the credit history of the poor (inaccessible or nonexistent) or in their level of 
income (variable and irregular). This situation, combined with the lack of 
information about the credit risk of these borrowers and high interest rates, 
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exclude the poor from the formal markets (Swaminathan, M., 1992; 
Woodruff, 2006). 
Often, transaction costs may be higher on loans to the poor than for higher 
income individuals because the current credit monitoring and enforcement 
of contracts is more difficult for the poor. The lenders could raise rates to 
cover costs and do, but to some extent (they raise rates until the level at 
which higher marginal rates increase the probability of default, which would 
reduce their profits). Thus, financial intermediaries, in the equilibrium, 
ration credit to customers that involve less research and monitoring costs, 
and whose contracts are cheaper to enforce. Even in the informal financial 
sector, interest rates do not balance the markets and credit rationing exists 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Furthermore, transaction costs faced by the poor can also be huge for their 
deposits. The time opportunity cost of the poor is also high. As there are few 
formal financial sector intermediaries in low-income areas, banking may 
lead to getting away a few hours of work, walking long distances, taking 
several transports and most likely, long lines. It can also involve filling out 
forms difficult to understand, time and effort to gather the required 
documentation. Therefore, this sector of the population relies more 
frequently to other financial services. This is another reason why people on 
low income are not only excluded from formal financial markets, but also 
from many informal sources of financing. 
In the case of health services, market failures occur because of problems 
associated with asymmetric information and monopolies in the distribution 
and supply of services. With regard to information about health care, it can 
be highly imperfect because a lot of medical treatments are complex and 
technical knowledge is required. In addition, prices knowledge is limited by 
the diversity and complexity of the diseases (no one knows how much 
health needs and the price that it represents). Hence, the cost of producing 
the service is not equal to the value that consumers attach, so health services 
are offered in a limited way. (Barr, 1998: 85, 282-283). 
Therefore, consumers are poorly informed both about the quantity of 
treatment they need and the quality of care they receive. Regularly checking 
health conditions can help, but information may be costly. If consumers are 
to make rational choices, they need to have the necessary information, and 
also the power to enforce their decisions. In this sense, lower income people 
may have less information relevant to choices about health; in addition, they 
may be less able to make use of any information they acquire.  
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In developing countries, poverty is highly correlated with illness and with 
access to health. In poverty, a disease can fill the space from a previously 
one already eradicated (Auerbach and Krimgold, 2001). The supply of 
effective health services is associated with the availability of medicines and 
technical equipment for the prevention and care, access to this services 
supply is restricted to the population living in urban areas or to people who 
can pay a high price for its use (Evans, et al., 1994). Additionally, in 
developing countries poor people rarely have health insurance, first for the 
high risk that this population imply and secondly for the large share of their 
income that should be spent on purchasing an insurance. 
Social security is related to problems of uncertainty and risk that stem from 
two sources: first, securing is generated because employment is a binary 
phenomenon in developing countries –i.e. an individual can be employed or 
unemployed on a short-term- and the retirement is a discrete event. Second, 
information problems related to contingencies such as long- term 
unemployment, inflation and major illness risks provide a justification for 
the state intervention to offer this service (Barr, 1998: 124-125). People who 
are not attached to any social security system provided by their employer do 
not have social benefits at work.  
Woolcock, M. (1999), van Bastelaer, Th. (2000), Grootaert, C., and van 
Bastelaer Th. (2002), assert that, social capital may be a mechanism by which 
people in developing countries can obtain needed financial, health and 
social services in the context of absent or imperfect markets. In Mexico, 
people use the social capital in the same way (Birdsall and Londoño, 1997b). 
“Social capital is a person’s or group’s sympathy toward another person or 
group that may produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential 
treatment for another person or group of persons beyond that expected in a 
relationship.” (Robison, Schmid, and Siles, 2002). 
People who receive subsidies could perceive the benefits of the aid obtained 
from public institutions and could extend trust levels granting transferences 
towards others (Barr, 1998). Those without access to formal financial market 
could use alternative financial mechanisms to get these services, like loans 
from relatives and friends or savings in RoSCAs4
                                                          
4  Informal Rotating Saving and Credit Associations 
. People involved in these 
informal schemes could grant resources to those who maintain a link or 
affinity (Mansell, 1995; van Bastelaer, Th., 2000). 
 167 
When people do not have access to clinics or hospitals, they use alternative 
medicine like homemade medicine, tonic remedies, a healer or a midwife; 
the provision of this kind of services could settle down links with the 
suppliers that can be relatives or known people (Woolcock, 1999; Narayan 
and Pritchett (1997). When people do not have social benefits at work like 
medical services, nursery school, mortgage and loans, among others, they 
often ask relatives and friends for their supply. People who use these kind of 
services could grant resources to others like reciprocal consequence of others 
aid. (Birdsall and Londoño, 1997b; Londoño and Székely, 1997; Morduch, 
1995). 
This paper studies the relationship between the social capital supply and the 
variables that reflect market failures. The hypothesis for the study is that 
market failure variables explain the social capital supply of people in 
Mexico. In this sense, the research question asks whether the social capital 
supply of individuals is affected by variables that reflect market failures. 
Since in developing countries poor people use their social capital to get 
public and financial services (Woolcock, 1999), the objective of this paper is 
to test if social capital is explained by market failures variables in a country 
like Mexico. 
II. Social capital definition and assumptions  
This paper is based on the assumption that households in Mexico have little 
or no access to formal institutions nor to the market to meet their needs, 
therefore they invest on their social resources to get the services they cannot 
obtain in a context of absent or imperfect markets. These services are related 
to the financial services, health and social insurance. Even these assumptions 
could be generalized to developing countries, this paper just study the 
Mexican case.  
The Robison, Schmid, and Siles’ social capital definition is used in this paper 
because: 
1. It takes into account the positive aspect of the concept (Portes, A. 
1998). 
2. It considers interdependence among individual utility functions: 
a set of individual preferences that incorporates the well-being of 
others in the own welfare (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969).  
3. It distinguishes what social capital is (sympathy) from what it 
makes (generates benefits, advantages or preferential treatment) 
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and where it resides (on the social relationship in which 
sympathy is expressed) (Robison, Schmid and Siles, 2002).  
The following assumptions were considered in this paper:  
The positive aspect of the concept is considered. This means “If social capital 
is positive an increase in j welfare results in an increase in the utility of i then 
i can increase their utility giving resources to j to increase j welfare” (Schmid 
and Robison, 1995: 60). In the positive aspect, the relationships through the 
social capital allow information flows, facilitate collective actions based on 
trust and create formal or informal mechanisms to protect themselves 
against contingency events and risks or to get advantages from 
opportunities.  
Individuals were considered because it is difficult to think in communities in 
decision-taking context. Social capital of an individual depends on their 
personal characteristics and these can produce in or outside market returns 
in their interactions with others (Coleman, 1990, Glaeser, Laibson and 
Sacerdote, 2002). This approach contrasts with the analysis based on the 
group that emphasizes institutions, norms and aggregated results rather 
than the decisions of individual actors (Schultz 1961; Becker 1964).  
From a “micro” perspective, social capital definition relates affinity 
relationships between people to the resources that are offered on a voluntary 
basis between them. This takes into account that in general, social capital 
and resources supply are linked because if income transfer is voluntary and 
agent i chooses an amount of its income to transfer it to agent j, this act 
maximizes both utility functions. Then transfers to agent j from agent i will 
increase j income with an increase in the social capital from agent j to agent i 
(Robinson and Siles, 1997). It is considered just social capital supply from i’s 
perspective because the only resources controlled are the granted but not the 
received. 
The literature on social capital explains its use as an input or output, the 
indicator used here is regarded as a product. This is because the social 
capital endowment is the result of the sympathy relationships between 
individuals who generate useful resources for themselves and others.  
The indicator of social capital considered refers to the resources invested in 
horizontal networks. These are the contributions, support or aid towards 
others or the community in which they live. Social capital supply is viewed 
as a bond to cover the income shocks, emergencies or to generate 
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opportunities, thus it could be seen as an indicator of social capital 
investment (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002).  
The social capital indicator relates theoretically with a sympathy coefficient 
which represents the degree to which a person incorporates the welfare of 
another people in his/her own utility and that leads them to share resources 
with others.   
The objective of this paper is to find individual characteristics that affect the 
social capital supply; to study the factors influencing the decisions of 
transfers between individuals and to know how people get resources 
because of the problems derived of imperfect or incomplete markets.  
III. Theoretical model to get the social capital indicator 
Based on Robison, Hanson and Steven (1995); Andreoni (1989), Echeverría 
and Díaz (2002), Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1995), Konow (2004), De la 
Torre, R. and L-Rodriguez, P. (2004) the following model looks for the 
relationship between social capital defined as sympathy and interpersonal 
transfers. The objective of this model is to find such social capital indicator 
based on the assumptions mentioned above.  
In this model, social capital depends on socio economic characteristics which 
are exogenous to the model. Here, the utility of an individual depends on 
his/her own income, his/her transfers level (T) and an assessment of its 
personal connection to another individual given by a social capital 
coefficient (K) defined as a sympathy coefficient. 
It considers that if agent i feels sympathy for j and i offers social capital to j, 
then j receives social capital. If agent i has sympathy for agent j, then any 
improvement in the welfare of j will also benefit the welfare of i indirectly. 
As a result, j can expect favours, preferential trade terms and other benefits 
from i that do not involve higher costs in i, only indirect benefits that can be 
obtained by improvements in the welfare of j.  
The relations of sympathy are represented by Kij ratios that shape the extent 
to which the welfare of the individual i is influenced by the well-being of the 
person j (Robison and Hanson and Steven 1995: 3; Schmid and Robison, 
1995: 43-58 and 59-66). The relationship from the person i towards j can be 
sympathetic (Kij> 0), antipathy (Kij <0) or neutral (Kij = 0). The social capital 
ratio (K) is a function of the relationship between the two players and the 
opportunity and awareness of exercising power. Since it is considered K> 0, 
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an increase in j income generates an increase in the i´s utility. So agent i 
could increase its own utility transferring to agent j. 
It is assumed that agents i and j have equal Cobb-Douglas utility functions. 
The individual´s utility functions depend on his/her final income, on 
transfers that one individual gives to another (Tt) and on a coefficient which 
measures the appreciation of a person to another, which also depends on a 
parameter (α) that incorporates the socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals such as gender, household size, region, age, education, tenancy, 
and so on. Each individual will have their own α, so if an individual j is 
analysed αi is used, if an individual i is analysed αi is used. This parameter 
α is attached just to the individual so it cannot be transferred to other 
individual or interchanged. These characteristics affect the sympathy level 
felt by an agent towards the other because depending on social distance 
from i to j, agent i might have a sense of sympathy or affinity with j. For 
example, if i and j share the same region,  age and gender, then i would have 
a higher affinity or sympathy to j. The following are the utility functions of 
individuals i and j.  
( ) TtLnKLnIfU ijijii α+=     (1) 
( ) TtLnKLnIfU jijijj α+=   (2) 
The sympathy described in the utility functions shows that an individual 
increases its welfare by increasing the income transferred to another and not 
by the level of welfare that reaches the other. Andreoni (1989 and 1990) calls 
this kind of sympathy “warm glow” and represents the idea that giving, by 
itself, generates satisfaction. Andreoni (1990) considered a model where the 
utility of an agent depends on the other, and their utility functions reflect 
two motivations to donate, the first relates to contributions and the second 
to the psychological satisfaction derived from the donation. Thus, the agents 
derive utility from donating, regardless of their current consumption. Its 
selfishness or altruism not only influences to determine the amount of 
transfers, but also to generate the experience of the donation "warm glow." 
Here transfers supply can be interpreted as a gift to the donor because the 
donor transfers something valuable for the other person. 
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The final income of individuals i and j is given by the sum of the initial 
income (Io) and net transfers (Tn). These net transfers, in turn, are composed 
of received transfers (Tr) less given transfers (Tt). 
TnIoIf iii +=  (3) 
TnIoIf jjj +=  (4) 
TtTrTn iii −=  (5) 
TtTrTn jjj −=  (6) 
Considering transaction costs equal to zero, it is assumed that the transfers 
made by agent i are equal to those received by agent j, and vice versa. 
TtTr ij =  (7) 
TtTr ji =   (8) 
The transfers granted (Tt) are the only variables that an agent can control. 
The Initial income (Io) and received transfers (Tr) are exogenous variables. 
Then, the estimated variable in the model will be Tt. The maximization 
problem is given by: 
( ) ( ) TtLnKTtTrIoLnUMax ijijiiii
Tt ij
α+−+=  (9a) 
( ) ( ) TtLnKTtTrIoLnUMax jijijjjjTt ji
α+−+=    (9b) 
The first order conditions of the maximization problem are the following: 
( )
01 =+
−+
−=
∂
∂
Tt
K
TtTtIoTt
U
ij
ij
ijii
i
α    (10a) 
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( )
01 =+
−+
−=
∂
∂
Tt
K
TtTtIoTt
U
ji
ji
jijj
j α    (10b) 
The first order conditions mean that the optimal transfers that individual 
gives are equal to its  income and its final sympathy level that depends on a 
vector of socioeconomic characteristics named α and is represented by age, 
gender, education, household size, tenancy, region, residence, occupation, 
and so on. These individuals’ characteristics influence the level of sympathy 
felt by one individual to another. For example a woman may feel more 
sympathy with someone who is of the same gender than with someone 
different. 
( )IfKTt iiji α=    (11a) 
( )IfKTt jjij α=   (11b) 
Since the income of each individual depends on the transfers it receives from 
the other, and in turn transfers to give depend on the income itself, it 
appears that the transfers to give depend on transfers to receive. This 
interaction leads to a Nash equilibrium after the replacement of the 
functions reaction. From the equations (11a) and (11b) it is obtained that 
social capital depends on a vector of socioeconomic characteristics and it is 
equal to a proportion of income that one individual transfers to another: 
( )
If
TtK
i
ie
ij =α
 (12a) 
( )
If
TtK
i
ie
ij =α
 (12b) 
The equations above show that the social capital supplied by each individual 
can be approached by the given transfers as a proportion of final income. 
Applying logarithms to (11a) and (11b) equations, (13a) and (13b) equations 
are obtained as following: 
( ) iiji IfLnKLnTt ln+= α   (13a) 
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( ) jjij IfLnKLnTt ln+= α    (13b) 
Since it was assumed that agent i and j have equal Cobb-Douglas utility 
functions, the results are the same for the individual i and j, the following 
expression represent same transfers behaviour for individual i and j:  
( ) LnIfLnKLnTt λα +=  (14) 
The social capital indicator is obtained from the equation (14) which is the 
ratio of given transfers as a proportion of final income. The coefficient λ 
represents the elasticity of transfers made with respect to income. It is 
assumed that λ=1, which means that transfers increase by the same 
proportion that income does, which means that when there are sympathy 
feelings towards other person, the income increase leads to an increase in 
transfers in the same proportion. From equation (12) it is obtained the 
following model where the parentheses terms represent the sympathy 
coefficient expressed in the term LnK(α). 
Each of the parameters α represent an individual's socio-economic 
characteristic for example gender, household size, region, age, education, 
tenancy, and so on. Each characteristic is linked to the sympathy level of 
each individual. The C constant indicates a degree of sympathy that does not 
depend on any of the above features. It is expected that the C antilogarithm 
was the base level of the individuals sympathy coefficient and this could 
increase or decrease depending on the behaviour of socio demographic 
variables. The sympathy level for a person could be determined by the 
constant C, if each of the socio economic variables that affect the social 
capital of an individual was zero. Each of the β coefficients represents an 
increase or decrease in the social capital of the individuals in terms of their 
socio-economic characteristics. The following model –from (14) equation- is 
the empirical model proposed for the estimation of the social capital 
determinants. 
( ) LnIfXXXcLnTt nn λβββ +++++= ...2211   (15) 
Since the product obtained from the sympathy relations is the indicator of 
social capital investment (KS). The indicator KS may be representing the 
following differential LnTt-λLnIf. Thus the empirical model to estimate 
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would assume the following form which is expressed in terms of the 
dynamic method of cointegration to be used. 
tntntttttt XXXcKS βββ ++++= ...2211      (16)   
As far as the empirical evidence regarding the kind of sympathy 
predominant, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1995) show that experimental 
findings suggest that pure altruism models do not correspond to the 
behaviour of individuals, but closer to a sympathy "warm glow ". However, 
Konow (2004) finds that the utility functions inferred are a combination of 
pure altruism and "warm glow." The implication of this is that the transfers 
as a proportion of income tend to underestimate the social capital to some 
extent. 
Through this model it is possible to obtain an indicator of social capital. This 
refers to the resources supplied by people as a proportion of their income, 
this indicator is associated with a sympathy coefficient which represents the 
degree to which a person incorporates the welfare of other in its utility 
function and that leads to share resources with others. In this model, the 
social capital of an individual depends on their personal characteristics and 
these can generate market or out market returns in interactions with others. 
From the model it is inferred the following: the utility maximization of each 
individual implies that the optimal transfers that an individual gives to 
another are equal to their final income and their level of sympathy, that is 
the social capital coefficient Kij which depends on a socioeconomic 
characteristics vector α, such as age, gender, education, household size, 
tenancy, religion, residence, occupation and market failures proxys, etc. 
( )IfKTt iiji α=  (17) 
Social capital offered by each individual can be approximated from their 
transfers as a proportion of their final income. Social capital indicator 
depends on a vector of socioeconomic characteristics. 
( )
If
TtK
i
ie
ij =α
 (18) 
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The indicator of social capital is the ratio of transfers granted with respect to 
income. The indicator KS would be represented by the following differential 
LnTt-λLnIf. The coefficient λ represents the elasticity of transfers over 
income. It is assumed that λ=1 which means that the transfers increase in the 
same proportion as the income.  
( ) LnIfLnKLnTt λα +=  (19) 
The following empirical model is expressed in dynamic terms because the 
objective is to follow the individual along the time. This model is going to be 
estimated. 
tntntttttt XXXcLnKS βββ ++++= ...2211  (20) 
Semieslaticities were suggested to avoid capture seasonal changes of 
income. In developing countries like Mexico they are frequent, since the 
income is more vulnerable to shocks that affect it. 
IV. Social capital indicators 
There were considered two types of social capital indicators (SK) based on 
what the literature calls "Bonding" and "Bridging" (Putnam, 2000). The first 
type directly contributes to the welfare of its members; the second opens 
opportunities and economic benefits for groups and communities as a whole 
(Narayan, 1999). This approach focuses on the way in which social capital is 
given, directly or as part of a process through groups or communities.  
Indicators of social capital (SK) 
Types of social capital 
by the way it is given 
Types of social capital by 
the form it is developed Indicator description  
Bonding Networks Support and aid to relatives and persons not members of the household. 
Bridging 1 Participation in organizations 
Contributions to charities, churches, Red 
Cross, and voluntary organizations. 
Bridging 2 Collective action Contributions for local religious festivities. 
Bridging 3 Collective action Contributions for local public works. 
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There were considered different indicators for the measurement of social 
capital because the objective is to observe the different effects of the 
independent variables on social capital. That is because the effects of an 
independent variable on social capital might be different depending on the 
type.  
V. Market failures variables 
There were built some indicators to approach market failure problems 
related to financial services, health services, social security and subsidies. 
The indicators that capture market failures are not measuring them as such, 
but are proxies of them, for example, the variable financial services is not 
measuring directly asymmetric information but represents an approach to 
this market failure in the sense that certain population sector has limited 
access to the banking system. This is because of the costs and risks involved 
in the allocation of formal credit to the population that has no collateral or 
guarantee (Mansell, 1995). 
In the case of health services, market failure occurs because of information 
problems and monopolies. With regard to information about health care, the 
prices knowledge is limited by the diversity and complexity of the diseases, 
thus the cost of producing the service is not equal to the value that 
consumers attach so health services are offered in a limited way. (Barr, 1998). 
Social security is related to problems of uncertainty and risk (Barr, 1998). 
People who are not attached to any social security system provided by their 
employer do not have social benefits at work. In this sense, market failures 
proxies built were the following: 
• Financial services: this is a market failure proxy that reflects 
asymmetric information problems in the credit market that limit 
access to some population to the banking system. This was built 
with people with limited or no access to formal financial services 
like banks. This is a dummy variable that takes values of 1 if 
people use credit and savings informal services such as deposits 
in batches, ROSCAs, community cooperatives and make loans to 
household members and friends and 0 otherwise.  
• Health services: this is a market failure proxy that reflects 
problems of asymmetric information and monopolies in their 
distribution and supplies of health services. This was built with 
people with no access to the private or official health services. 
This is a dummy variable that takes values of 1 if people use 
alternative health services such as herbs, amulets, remedies, 
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syrups, tonics and potions, healer, bonesetter, witch or midwife 
and 0 otherwise.  
• Social security: this is a proxy variable that reflects market failure 
problems linked with public goods. Social security is related to 
uncertainty and risk. Benefits from social security are medical 
services, nursery school, mortgage and loans, among others. This 
was built with people without social benefits at work. This is a 
dummy variable that takes values of 1 if people do not have 
social benefits from work like medical services, food aid or 
pantry, day care, training (courses, scholarships), mortgage, cash 
loans, transport expenses, discount or exemption on the payment 
of services (electricity, telephone, etc.), or don’t make use of 
alternative private social services, and 0 otherwise.  
• Subsidies: this is a market failure proxy that reflects issues of 
equity in the market that generate the need for subsidies. Markets 
provide goods and services to a price that covers costs but 
markets could not offer certain goods and services. Subsidies 
represent a market failure indicator because when markets are 
looking for efficiency, they sacrifice fairness. This was built with 
people that receive subsidies. This is a dummy variable that takes 
values of 1 if at least one household member received resources 
from governmental antipoverty programs named “Procampo” 
(like its initials in Spanish) and “Oportunidades” (like its initials 
in Spanish) and 0 otherwise.  
Indicators used as market failures were selected considering the available 
information in the Income and Expenditure Household Mexican Surveys 
(ENIGHs). This is to be consistent with the information source where 
proxies of social capital were obtained. 
VI. Data and methodology 
There is a technical restriction to test hypotheses related to the life cycle5, 
mobility expected or physical distance6
                                                          
5  Villagómez, F. Alejandro. (2000) “A dynamic analysis of household decision-making : the 
Mexican Case” by F. Alejandro Villagómez, Andrés Zamudio. BID, Research Network 
working paper ; R-415.  
. This is because in Mexico there are 
no panel surveys with more than 3 reports containing social capital variables 
with features of the same individual over time at regular intervals. An 
6  Specifically if the residence variable is been considered as a proxy for physical distance  i.e. 
if the work was done in Mexico or abroad, by the migration effect. 
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alternative to obtain data following the same individual over time is through 
statistical techniques like the synthetic panel, using this technique it is 
possible to perform an analysis on the determinants of social capital in 
Mexico over several years. It is possible to build a synthetic panel using 
cohorts from cross section database. The cohorts are built based on 
individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics that allow us to follow them 
over time. 
Another aspect relevant about the data is that the database used in this 
analysis is representative in income, i.e. it allows to record almost all the 
sources of individual’s income in order to derive the proportion that social 
capital transfers represents for individuals in monetary terms. Furthermore, 
the same database needs information available to build the indicators of 
market failures. 
The results in this paper could be generalized to other countries if they have 
surveys with the kind of transfers used in this paper and those are 
representative in revenue. Additionally, it is important to have panel 
surveys or build synthetic panels to observe the behavior of individuals over 
time in the relationship social capital and proxies of market failures. 
The following will describe the explanatory variables used in the model. To 
control for socioeconomic individual situation, individual characteristics 
were selected related to his/her socioeconomic environment. The variables 
related to these characteristics were age, sex, education, telephone, region, 
residence or migration, employment characteristics, rate of economic 
dependence (TDE), and household size. 
Four bonding and bridging social capital indicators and combinations 
between them were used as dependent variables. These indicators consist in 
the resources supplied by people as a proportion of their income that 
theoretically relate to the sympathy coefficient and represent the degree to 
which a person joins the welfare of another in its utility function and that 
leads them to share resources with others. The exogenous variables were 
market failures and control variables related to demographic and 
socioeconomic aspects. Then, twelve social capital supply models where 
estimated to observe the variations and consistency of the results on the 
dependent variables.  
The data -social capital and market failures indicators as well as control 
variables- were obtained from Income and Expenditure Household Mexican 
Surveys. In the empirical model only household heads were considered 
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because it is assumed that home transfers decisions are influenced by the 
head of household. Estimations with Tobit models were made since 
information was presented in censurated form – values were presented in 
continuous form and were less than 0 and behave like a normal distribution 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
In econometric terms, social capital presented an endogeneity problem 
(Haussman 1978) in the sense that people with more resources could be 
granted more resources to others and acquires social capital more easily. 
With this problem, the estimated coefficients could be biased and 
inconsistent if they are obtained through the OLS method. The solution to 
this problem is to use instrumental variables and implement a causality test 
in both directions. The problem with this method lies in finding the 
appropriate instrumental variable. This method is useful only if the 
instruments are plausible. However it is not possible to construct 
instrumental variables with the dataset used in this paper.  
Other alternative to correct for endogeneity is to work with historical data 
because it is not possible to reverse causality when current variables are 
linked with past socioeconomic indicators. This method allows to test 
whether social capital indicators are affected over time by the variables that 
determine it. Synthetic panels for seven years with population cohorts were 
elaborated to follow population throughout the time (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002 and 2004). The cohorts were built considering the year of birth 
and schooling.  
Endogeneity in time series is associated with spurious regression -two series 
could be correlated because they have a tendency over time for reasons 
related to unobserved factors. Some of the series constructed through the 
panel method presented the problem of spurious regression. Some of the 
variables used had a high correlation. This is the case with the observed 
correlation between the variable rural and variable education, or the 
correlation observed between the variable rural and telephone or the 
correlation observed between the variable white collar and education. 
Factors associated might be related to the lack of infrastructure or with the 
restrictions faced by the labour market and are not directly observed in this 
model. To correct spurious regression problem, the cointegration method 
was used for panel data (Engle and Granger, 1987; Pedroni, 2000; Granger, 
Hyung and Jeon 2001) from where estimated coefficients were obtained.  
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VII. Results 
The econometric results are shown in the chart bellow. Based on the results 
obtained through the econometric models, it is observed in general terms 
that social capital is related in most of the models with market failures 
variables, thus market failure variables explain in some sense the social 
capital supply of people in Mexico. The following chart shows a summary of 
econometrics models results under different types of social capital. 
Independent 
variable name 
Name of the dependent variables, different types of social capital (LnSK) 
Bonding Bridging 1 Bridging 2 Bridging 3 
Networks Participation in organizations Collective action Collective action 
Support and aid for 
relatives and 
people not 
household 
members 
Contributions to 
charities, churches, 
red cross and 
voluntary 
organizations 
Contributions to 
local and religious 
festivities 
Contributions for 
local and public 
works 
Age -0.0087* (-0.2415) -0.0585** (-1.9304) -0.0449* (-0.8667) -0.0967** (-1.5301) 
Age2 0.000077 * (0.6868) 0.000599* (1.1002) 0.00038* (0.9603) 0.00127* (0.1857) 
Education 0.0305 ** (0.7964) 0.0352* (1.0630) 0.0450* (0.8469) 0.1279** (1.9541) 
Rate of 
economic 
dependence 
(TDE) 
-0.4268 * (-1.2676) -0.0399* (-0.1461) -0.5414* (-1.2585) -0.5836* (-1.0706) 
Telephone 0.4671  (1.7985) 0.2585** (1.2022) 0.7018 (2.3685) 0.3718 (0.9979) 
Women 0.6334***(2.2957) 0.4719** (1.9357) -0.4473** (-1.4351) 0.4038* (1.0147) 
Rural 1.1658*** (4.8622) -0.4177** (-1.6625) 0.9236*** (3.5395) 0.3147* (0.9336) 
White collar 0.1841 (0.7670) -0.1547 (-0.6369) -0.6687** (-2.1068) -1.7166*** (-4.1478) 
Extended 
household -0.1657*(-0.6894) -0.5545*** (-2.5103) -0.2192* (-0.8126) -0.1144* (-0.3304) 
Residence or 
migration -1.8269 (-12.3159) 0.0891 (0.6579) 
-0.7562*** (-
3.1621) -0.9293*** (-3.4398) 
Health 
services  0.8132**(2.3774) 0.6778** (2.1863) 0.9720 (0.9049) 0.7245*** (4.5687) 
Financial 
services 0.6578***(3.7951) 0.7663 (0.1086) 0.6910** (2.1149) 0.5112**(2.5478) 
Subsidies 0.0166 (0.0117) 0.4212***(3.3600) 0.9281 (0.5803) 0.1658** (3.1298) 
Social security  0.7458***(3.9443) 0.5442***(2.1584) 0.7831***(3.8969) 0.45896***(3.6169) 
     
R2 05277 0.5422 0.8379 0.7866 
R2 adjusted  -0.2061 -0.3689 -0.0071 -1.9489 
Note: This table contains the results using the method of Kao and Chiang (2000) for the 
estimation of the panel not stationary. Social capital indicator (LnSK) is the dependent variable 
(LnSocial Capital = Transfers / Income). Social capital indicators are considered in the different 
forms defined. The estimation is for the synthetic panel and covers the period 1992-2004 every 
two years considering the ENIGHs of those years. The coefficients were estimated under the 
method DOLS (The Dynamic OLS) at ***99%, **95% o *90% significance level. The numbers in 
parentheses refer up to the t-ratio values. Positive signs mean increases and negative decreases.  
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The results derived from the estimations are the following7
• If people do not have formal health services, they help relatives 
and friends in around 81% more than people having these 
services. In other words, the ratio of transfers granted to people -
like relatives and friends- with respect to income is 81% greater 
among people who do not have formal health services than 
among people who do have formal health services. If people do 
not have formal financial services, they help relatives and friends 
in around 65% more than people having these services. If people 
do not have social security derived from job benefits, they help 
relatives and friends in around 74% more than people having 
these services, ceteris paribus.  
:  
• If people receive subsidies, they grant more contributions to 
beneficial institutions like churches, Red Cross and ecclesiastical 
services in around 42% more than people without subsidies. If 
people do not have formal health services, they grant more 
contributions to beneficial institutions like churches, Red Cross 
and ecclesiastical services in around 67% more than people 
having these services. If people do not have social security, they 
grant more contributions to beneficial institutions like churches, 
Red Cross and ecclesiastical services in around 42% more than 
people having this service, ceteris paribus. 
• If people do not have social security, they make more communal 
contributions for local celebrations (like religion celebration) in 
around 78% more than people having this service. If people do 
not have formal financial services, they make more communal 
contributions for local celebrations (like religion celebration) in 
around 69% more than people having these services, ceteris 
paribus. 
• If people receive subsidies, they make more contributions for 
local public service works in around 16% more than people 
without subsidies. If people do not have social security benefits, 
they make more contributions for local public service works in 
around 45% more than people having these benefits. If people do 
not have financial services, they make more contributions for 
                                                          
7  These refer to semielasticities. 
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local public service works in around 51% more than people 
having these services. If people do not have health services, they 
make more contributions for local public service works in around 
72% more than people having these services, ceteris paribus.  
Other findings using control variables were the following: it is inferred in 
general terms that social capital is higher between very young people 
(children) when compared to older people. Young people have less social 
capital. People with higher education, women, and people from rural areas 
invest more in social capital. People who live in households with more 
economic dependents and who live in extended households invest less in 
social capital. These results also coincide with the literature (authors are in 
parenthesis): 
• Age and age2: Social capital is related to the effects of the life cycle; 
at the beginning, social capital is high and then decreases with 
age (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002).  
• Education: Individuals who invest in human capital also invest in 
social capital (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002; Krishna and 
Uphoff, 1999).  
• Rate of economic dependency (TDE): The higher the number of 
dependents in a household, the lower social capital investment 
(Coleman, 1990). 
• Telephone: The information mechanisms increase social 
connections, but individuals with a high value of time 
accumulate less social capital (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999)  
• Women: being a woman affects positively the needs of social 
capital investment (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Coleman 1990)  
• Rural: social capital is higher in rural than urban area (Krishna 
and Uphoff, 1999; Coleman, 1990; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; 
Putnam, 2000; Knowles and Anker, 1981).  
• Whitecollar: social capital investment is high in occupations with 
high returns to the social skills (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 
2002)  
• Household extension: a larger number of members inside a 
household reduces social capital (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; 
Coleman, 1988; Furstenberg, and F. Hughes, M., 1995; Coleman, 
1990) 
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• Residence or migration: social connections between people 
decreased substantially with the physical distance and 
transportation costs (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002). 
VIII. Conclusions 
The implications of the above results are that in the presence of market 
failures (lack of services), people invest in social capital. As a result, there are 
variables that reflect market failures associated to bonding and bridging 
social capital indicators when financial, health and social benefits markets 
fail. These market failures are associated with people using alternative 
health services -as homemade medicine, tonic remedies, midwife-, 
alternative social benefits –as children care, social guaranty, medical services 
and loans provided by relatives and friends- participation in schemes of 
microfinances and subsidies –as scholarships and food aid provided by 
public institutions. 
If these market failures proxies explain in some sense social capital 
indicators when credit and saving mechanisms, health services, job social 
benefits and subsidies are analyzed, thus an inverse causality could be 
considered. In other words, the equilibrium of these markets could be 
explained by social capital variables –as networks, trust, membership and 
collective action- additionally to traditional mechanisms of market 
adjustments in prices.  
If people that do not have access to formal services invest more in their 
networks through transfers, it might be thought that social capital is a useful 
mechanism to provide resources to low-income people (who generally are 
not participating in the formal markets). In this sense, social capital can be 
harnessed as a mechanism for targeting resources and public programs to 
support low-income population without access to formal market. That is, the 
communities identified with the highest concentration of positive social 
capital are the best candidates to receive public support. These communities 
with more social capital could benefit from the most efficient way to use 
public resources as compensatory mechanisms when no access to other 
goods. It could be thought that those who invest more in their networks of 
social capital through transfers are also those that could expand and/or 
potentiate the benefits of public programs to the rest of the people with 
whom have ties of sympathy.  
For further generalization of the results it would be desirable to explore the 
hypothesis tested in this paper with other indicators of social capital such as 
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trust, membership, collective action and networking. It could be tested with 
other models such as pooling data using instrumental variables 
methodology to correct the endogeneity problem. Additionally it would be 
appropriate to conduct this study in a large sample of countries. However, 
the Mexican case is useful as a benchmark for future comparisons with other 
developing countries. 
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